American fo rces in the Ryukyus settled into the garrison phase of operations in September 1945. By then most enemy holdouts had been captured, and the wholesale movement of citizens necessitated by the command's base development plan had ceased. Extensive relief efforts conducted by military government units had averted the threat of star[1]vation and epidemics among civilians. Now that there was time for re[1]fl ection and assessment, civil affairs offi cers on Okinawa began to rethink the mission of military government in broader terms. Despite problems and discouragements encountered during the assault phase, many of these men had retained more than a small measure of idealism; given the op[1]portunity and resources, they would eagerly attempt to recreate a peaceful Okinawan society. To that end they began to look beyond the post-assault relief measures toward a return to prewar social and economic normalcy. It was obvious that any restoration would be closely linked to military concerns. During the postwar years Ameri can military interest in the islands underwent several permutations. Although Okinawa remained im[1]portant in all American strategic planning, the government's economic commitment to the Ryukyus was not so constant, and the military gov[1]ernment effort there suffered severely from austere postwar military budg[1]ets. A stepchild of the Far East Command, the Ryukyuan command's physical and manpower needs tended to receive a lower priority in an organi zation where units in Japan and Korea took precedence. In the same time period, the command watched its university-prepared military government personnel depart. Those who had not only parti cipated in the planning for the campaign but had also organized the rehabilitation of civilian society were rapidly being demobilized. They were replaced by individuals who had neither the intellectual commitment to the job nor the singular advantages of their predecessors in education and train[1]ing. These postwar manpower realities combined with strategic, eco[1]nomic, and social considerations to create fo rmidable tasks for military government during a period that might accurately be described as the nadir of American interest in the Ryukyus. Okinawa and Postwar Strategy In the weeks following the collapse of Japan, the Joint Planning Staff looked at the world-wide base sites and divided them into several cate[1]gories. Some it decided were "primary base areas," those essential to the security of the United States and its possessions or necessary to projected military operations; others it classified in lesser categories. The Joint Chiefs accepted their staff's definitions and coordinated their discussion of bases with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as part of the process of negotiating with foreign governments to secure the needed sites.' As for the Ryukyus, the Joint Chiefs, from the first, included the islands in their list of primary base areas, assuming continued American control over the islands either by direct sovereignty or at the very least through United Nations trusteeship. The Department of State questioned this assumption. Secretary James F. Byrnes passed on to the new president, Harry S. Truman, his depart[1]ment's conclusion that " political and diplomatic considerations" made it necessary to consider the Ryukyus "minor islands which should be returned to Japan and demilitarized .'" The secretary's concern for dip[1]lomatic considerations stemmed from the ambiguous status of the Ryu[1]kyus at the conclusion of World War II. On 26 July 1945 the United States, Great Britain, China, and, later, the Soviet Union, agreed at the Potsdam Conference that " Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.'" In its formal surrender on 2 September 1945 Japan accepted the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration. Its Okinawa Prefecture, consisting of Okinawa, Miyako, and Yaeyama Gunto and surrounding islands, ceased to exist. But the ultimate status of Okinawa remained unclear, and the vagueness of the phrase "such minor islands as we determine" contained the seeds of potential territorial discord among the interested nations. The military potential of Okinawa's bases notwithstanding, Secretary Byrnes sought to minimiz.e the chances o
international disputes by demilitarizing the Ryukyus and returning them to Japanese control. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reacted quickly and negatively to the De[1]partment of State's position. Acting through the State-War-Navy Coor[1]dinating Committee, they urged the secretary of state to inform the president of their contrary assessment. On 10 September 1946 Fleet Ad[1]miral William D. Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed the president of the military leaders' "grave concern" over the proposed return of the Ryukyus to Japan and urged Truman to review the matter further. 4 Continuing the argument, State officials pointed out to the president that retaining possession of the Ryukyus could create diplomati c and political problems and would in any event certainly be an economic drain on the United States. The military chiefs contended, on the other hand, that the secretary of state underestimated the military value of the Ryu[1]kyus, especially Okinawa, and that the cost of maintaining the islands was minimal compared to the lives and treasure expended in capturing Okinawa-or to the cost of recapturing the island again from a hostile power. ' The debate would take several curious twists and turns as the basic assumptions that supported it changed abruptly in the immediate postwar years. Both the Joint Chiefs and the Department of State assumed that international affairs in Asia would revolve around a democratic China controlled by the Nationalists and assisted by American aid and support; that America and the Soviet Union would continue to work in approx[1]imately the same sort of international cooperation that had characterized their wartime partnership; and that decolonization of South and South[1]east Asia would come quickly and easily with a number of independent democratic nations emerging. All these assumptions proved incorrect, although it was not until the late 1940s that the new, harsh realities would be fully appreciated ' Disagreement over the near- and long-term disposition of Okinawa persisted, but remained low-key and generally went unpublicized. The secretary of state tended to focus attention on the Japanese question, and until 1951 the issue of Okinawa's status remained a corollary to the larger issue of a peace treaty between Japan and her former adversa ri es.' The Department of State was content to let the War Department administer occupi ed territori es. For their part, the Joint Chi efs concentrated on the emerging military realities of the postwar period that included America's expanded global responsibilities and the potential threat from long-range air power. By retaining ex isting ove rseas bases and by securing others, they hoped to provide a defense perimeter, as an Army spokesmen put it to a congressional aud ience in 1946, "surrounding ourselves with a cordon of bases from which our forces may intercept attacking units and from which we may launch immediate ... counterblows.'" As a large Fa r East outpost, Ok inawa was a strategic link in this "cordon of bases." To harden this link the Joint Chi efs committed a large occupation force and drew up elaborate base development plans for the island, although the particulars of these plans and the size of the force wou ld vary from year to yea r with the ebb and flow of international events. Postwar Militwy Olganization T he last months of the war ushered in a period of rapid change in the organi zation of military forces on the Ryukyu Islands. The Joint Chiefs originall y assigned both operational control and military gove rn[1]ment responsibility for the islands to the Navy, but the fact was neither the Army nor the Navy wanted to assume responsibility for the region ' Admiral Nimitz argued that since the Tenth Army had in vaded Okinawa to stage the planned invasion of Japan, it should assume these respon[1]sibilities. Bowing to the Pacific commander's request, the Joint Chi efs, on 18 July 19 4 5, ordered control of the islands, excluding certain naval facilities, turned over to the Army. This transfer of command, they noted , was to be a temporary expedient; once the invasion of the Japanese home islands was accomplished, command of the Ryukyus was to be returned to the Navy. 'o Effecti ve 31 July, Headquarters, Island Command, Oki[1]nawa, was reconstituted as Headquarters, Army Service Command I (AS
