The Impact of Invasion and Occupation on the Civilians of Okinawa
By Commander Henry Stanley Bennett (M.C.), U. S. Naval Reserve
February 1946 Proceedings Vol. 72/2/516
COMMENTS
This report seeks to present certain features of the material and psychological effect on the Okinawans of our invasion and the subsequent operations and occupation, and of some of the policies and practices with which the people have come in contact during the first three months following our initial landings.
Background.—The people of Okinawa, though racially akin to the Japanese, have for centuries been peace-loving and law- abiding agrarians looking to China for cultural leadership. Their islands have been unmarred by war for over six centuries, except for the brief and not very destructive Satsuma invasion of 1609, when a Japanese protectorate was established. Conditions remained tranquil and undisturbed until well after the Japanese annexation of 1871 The people submitted with docility to Japanese conscription methods, sent their sons to war without enthusiasm, and changed their ways and outlook but slightly right up to the time of our assault on the island.
Without doubt, our military operations in the Okinawa Gunto have caused far greater disruption, destruction, and casualties than any previous violent historical episode in the archipelago, and cannot be regarded by the people as anything but a calamitous disaster.
Characteristics of the people of Okinawa and neighboring islands.—Although Okinawa had been incorporated as an integral part of Japan and the citizenry had been given at least legal or theoretical equality with Japanese in the main islands, it is now apparent that there are certain differences between the two groups.
Similarities between Okinawans and Japanese may be seen in that both groups show the same thrift and industry and docility to established authority.
Differences between Okinawans and Japanese may be presented as follows:
(1) Okinawa has no military tradition. It has been peaceful for centuries, whereas Japan has known and glorified warfare and warriors since prehistoric times.
(2) In Okinawa much remains of the former cultural orientation towards China, so that the characteristic Japanese glorification of military virtues and achievements has not been implanted deeply in the people. Those Okinawans in whom it has been instilled most deeply are soldiers, the majority of whom are not on the island, but overseas and unlikely to return in any numbers except as chastened prisoners of war.
(3) The nationalistic orientation of Shintoism and Emperor worship has been introduced into Okinawa within the memory of living souls. It has taken but shallow root, and should soon wither. Indigenous and ancient superstitious animism and spirit worship remain strong.
(4) Okinawans are faced with facts refuting much of the false Japanese propaganda and indoctrination to which they have been subjected in recent years. Destroyed have been the fostered notions that the Japanese armed forces are invincible; that it is the divine destiny of Japan to rule the world; that Japan would protect them; that Japanese soil would never be violated, and that American troops are beasts who would rape the women and kill all inhabitants.
It is apparent that the Okinawan people as a whole have not the remotest conception of the issues of this war as we see them. Along with the Formosans, the Okinawans became entangled passively as a result of the Japanese annexation of the islands in the late nineteenth century. One cannot fairly attribute to them aggressive propensities or war-guilt and there appears to be no particular justification for adopting a vengeful or punitive attitude towards the Okinawan populace as a whole.
Effect of operations on population and sex ratio.—In 1940, the population of the Okinawa Gunto was slightly over 475,000; 435,000 being on Okinawa Island. The population density on Okinawa Jima was 901 per square mile. This is nearly twice the population density of Japan proper and over twenty times that of continental United States. On Okinawa the sex ratio was 115 women to every 100 men.
During the last twenty-five years, there has been a tendency towards a decrease in population in the Okinawa Gunto. This decrease can be attributed to emigration of Okinawans to Japan proper, to the Japanese mandated islands, to the Hawaiian Islands or elsewhere. Migration to Japan has been particularly heavy in the last few years in order to provide labor for war plants. This emigration took away more men than women, contributing to the sex ratio cited above.
After the outbreak of the “Greater East Asia War,” conscription into the Japanese Army or Navy removed many of the able- bodied men from Okinawa. Prior to October 10, 1944, the greater number of men so conscripted were scattered throughout the Empire and conquered areas. Perhaps 15,000 males left the island in this way. This conscription would further reduce the civilian population of Okinawa to 420,000 and increase the aberrant sex ratio to that of 125 women to 100 men.
Subsequent to the first great air strike on Okinawa on October 10, 1944, the disruptive trends in the population were accentuated.
Many of the wealthy and prominent people and administrative officials attempted to flee to Japan. Some were sunk on the way. Perhaps 5,000 people succeeded in leaving Okinawa for the purposes of flight, most of these being Japanese, as contrasted with Okinawans.
After the first of the year of 1945, virtually every able-bodied Okinawan of military age was conscripted, the bulk of them into the Boei Tai, or Home Guard Force. Some of these have subsequently found their way into regular army units. In either case, about 30,000 additional conscripts were removed thus from the civilian population, the majority destined for slaughter or capture in the defense of the island.
The effect of the flight and the loss of those conscripted recently would be to reduce the civilian population of Okinawa to less than 400,000 and further accentuate the sex ratio to that of about 140 women to 100 men.
Thus it appears that conscription of males and loss of those conscripts in battle on Okinawa and elsewhere have reduced the population by fully 10 per cent, greatly increased the ratio of women to men, and subjected the populace to the nearly complete decimation of a generation of able-bodied males.
The extent of the total reduction of the population can only be estimated at present. The 10 per cent of the population conscripted into the army or home guard must be written off. Perhaps 5,000 fled. Civilian casualties from bombing, shellings, and other exigencies of war cannot be estimated accurately, but were undoubtedly very heavy, particularly in the group caught behind the Japanese lines during the fighting. Prolonged periods of hiding in caves on meager rations and in poor sanitary conditions favored toll from disease, particularly among small infants and the aged and infirm. It is probable that a certain number of civilians have been sealed in caves, although efforts were made to avoid thus interring civilians.
On July 12, there were about 265,000 civilians within our custody on Okinawa. Allowing for stragglers in areas not yet combed thoroughly, it seems unlikely that there were many more than 300,000 Okinawans left alive on the island, leaving between 75,000 and 100,000 civilians—perhaps one quarter of the population—unaccounted for. Unless this loss can be attributed to some large unknown emigration, one can only conclude that most of them have perished from one cause or another resulting directly or indirectly from hostilities.
Among the civilians within our lines in mid-July, children under twelve years and old folks over forty-five comprised the greater part of the total number. Adult women outnumbered adult men by well over two to one. There were very few men of family-producing age in the group.
Effect of operations on population distribution.—The surviving civilian populace has been completely dislocated. The air attack on October 10 destroyed 80 per cent of Naha and killed an unknown number of civilians. Many survivors who considered themselves in likely target areas left their homes and sought refuge in the countryside, oftentimes miles from their place of domicile. Among civilians entering our lines during the first week of April, 1945, were some who had been residents of Naha and who had been living in caves in the hills since October, 1944.
Following this great raid, civilians set assiduously about digging themselves air-raid shelters and caves. This was in addition to the extensive fortifications undertaken by the military. Many thousands of holes were thus hewn out, and in some instances tombs and natural caves were prepared and improved for utilization as shelters. Although each of these formed a potential defensive position, in actuality few of the caves in the northern three-quarters of the island were used defensively, the majority of them serving solely as civilian refuges and a smaller number for the storage of supplies or munitions.
After October, the voluntary partial evacuation of Naha and other sectors in the south was aggravated by an attempt on the part of the military to remove most of the civilians in that area. A prefectural order is said to have been put out ordering civilians living in the Shuri-Naha area and to the south to leave for the northern part of the island. The main purpose behind this may have been to remove civilians from the anticipated main defensive area, both for their own safety and to reduce the demands on food supplies available for the defending forces. Some civilians were evicted from their homes so their premises could be used by the military. In any case, the greater number of inhabitants of the area in question did go north, so that by the time of our landings and the establishment of a definitive front line across the island north of Machinato and Yonabaru airfields in mid-April, it was estimated that over three-quarters of the civilians were north of (or within) our lines, whereas beforehand over two-thirds of the populace dwelt in the area to the south.
During late 1944 and early 1945, movement of civilians was largely confined to the inhabitants of the southern areas. However, during March our air strikes on the island picked up again, and on March 20, a naval blockade was instituted and systematic reduction of defenses commenced by naval gunfire and air attack. Attention was directed towards the areas backing landing beaches or alternate beaches and at supposed or actual gun positions, pillboxes, barracks, suicide boat or midget sub bases, and the like. Many of these actual or supposed installations were in or near villages or towns, and inhabited areas north of Naha began to suffer extensive damage at this time.
Casualties were inflicted on civilians during this phase, and as the threat to an area materialized, the inhabitants felt prompted to move to the hills. Towns and villages not subjected to gunfire or air attack were, nevertheless, usually evacuated later on when advancing troops approached, oftentimes many days after our landings. As a result, virtually every inhabited locality overrun by our troops was found deserted, whether or not the houses were damaged extensively. Hence, for all practical purposes, it is safe to say that virtually every inhabitant of Okinawa was impelled by our military activities to leave his home and live elsewhere for a period varying from a few days to several months.
Displacement of civilians within our lines.— Within a day or two after our landings, civilians began to appear within our lines. Most of those taken at first were aged Okinawans who were too feeble to travel far, and who were found hiding in caves near their villages. It was quite evident that the inhabitants were fearful of us, and many continued to flee before our advance. However, within a week 10,000 civilians had entered our custody, and by the end of April the figure stood at 120,000.’
Military government temporarily set up civilian concentration areas at Sobe and at Koza, and later permanent ones at Ishikawa, Jinuza, Taira, and elsewhere, in which the great majority of civilians were placed. These sizable villages showed considerable damage, but possessed many habitable dwellings. Women, children, and old folks were placed in such villages, usually under very crowded conditions. Able-bodied men were confined to stockades for reasons of security. The people in any given concentration did not represent the inhabitants of that locality; so complete had been the dislocation and so variable the wandering of individuals during operations that each camp displayed an indiscriminate mixture of inhabitants from many parts of the island.
There was a considerable shift of population even subsequent to an initial adjustment under Military Government. Several sizable concentrations of civilians were moved completely weeks or months after being established. These movements were necessary in order to make more land available for base development, or in order to remove people from areas of danger from enemy air attack.
Noteworthy among these post-occupational population shifts instigated by our forces is the case of the inhabitants of northern and western Motobu Peninsula, where war damage to houses was comparatively slight, and where no heavy fighting took place. Most of the inhabitants left their villages to hide in the hills when troops initially went over the area in early and mid-April. Within a few days their fear was overcome and they returned to their own homes, even though in many instances troops were encamped near by. The people resumed their village life and planting and harvesting as best they could, and for two months and a half lived peaceably much as before the invasion, being the only community on the island to be so fortunate. After the cessation of organized resistance, it became necessary to put troops into the area for rehabilitation purposes, and the civilian population was accordingly evacuated. Very little preparation was made to receive these people in the area to which they were moved and about 20,000 of them were driven in trucks to an east coast area and deposited in open fields. It was several days before all of them were given even minimal shelter.
Thus it develops that virtually the entire population of Okinawa Shima has been displaced and disorganized by our invasion. Survivors are destined to be cared for in relatively small areas of concentration without regard to their original place of domicile. On some of the outlying islands of the Okinawa Gunto the displacement is less drastic.
Separation of families.—A very pitiful concomitant of the Okinawa operation, as of all wars, has been the separation of numerous families during the disorganization and hasty flight of the people. In a few instances families were unintentionally separated by our own agencies, who in the early confused days on occasion brought Okinawan women in to supposed safety from the hills, only to learn that the children had been left behind because no one in the patrol could understand the women’s protestations when they were led away without an opportunity to go into the caves to get their infants. Many families have been reunited after temporary separation and steps are under way to do the same for other split households, but it seems improbable that complete success is likely to be achieved.
The effect of operations on property.— Buildings on Okinawa did not fare well during this campaign. The air strike of October 10,1944, leveled 80 per cent of Naha and did extensive damage elsewhere. Subsequent air strikes, naval gunfire, and artillery missions have wrought great destruction. The 20 per cent of Naha which survived October 10 is now gone. Shuri, a town of 18,000, is entirely destroyed. All towns and sizable villages have sustained extensive damage. A few remote small villages and many isolated farmhouses survived the fighting almost intact. In most towns and villages a few houses still stand with little or no damage.
Particular attention was paid to schools and other large buildings by our air strikes and naval gunfire missions. It may be they were regarded as “possible barracks.” The Ai Raku En Leper Colony on Yagaji Shima was destroyed in a series of attacks, and we were faced with the necessity of providing sufficient material to restore partially the institution in order that lepers might have minimum humanitarian care. Many schools were similarly singled out for destruction in areas which were occupied days later without any resistance. Very extensive damage was done in Nago by artillery after the town had been completely evacuated, and after it had been entered and reconnoitered by our own Military Government officials, who found it clear of enemy, but who were forced to retire because of our own artillery fire. Such unnecessary destruction deprived our forces of many usable buildings and accentuated greatly the very grave overcrowding and shortage of shelter with which the civilians within our care were confronted.
However, perhaps the greater part of the destruction of buildings was a necessary or unavoidable concomitant of war. This was particularly true in Sobe, Kadena, and elsewhere in the vicinity of our landing beaches, and in Shuri, Naha, and other towns which was utilized defensively by the enemy.
An estimated 60 or 70 per cent of the buildings on Okinawa appear to have been destroyed or severely damaged as a direct result of operations. Those remaining intact or slightly damaged after the fighting have not been left undisturbed. A great number have been or are destined to be dozed under to make room for roads, airfields, or other installations. Thus the village of Kadena is now buried in the traffic circle at an important intersection. Rubble from the houses contributed to the fill used in the roads. Roads leading through inhabited localities have usually been widened or straightened without regard to the necessity for cutting through existing ruins or through damaged or intact buildings, even though the process might wipe out an entire village, as was the case at Hiza.
Numerous damaged and intact buildings have been torn down by natives under our supervision for purposes of salvaging building materials. The lumber and tile so salvaged have been transported to concentration areas for construction of shelters for the overcrowded natives.
There was considerable destruction of buildings by burning in areas well behind the fighting front. Many of these fires were accidental or resulted from carelessness. Some were burned deliberately by individuals who sought to remove an alleged health hazard or to clear an area desired for other purposes. This practice was forbidden because of the necessity for salvaging all possible building materials. A number of houses were burned by Japanese guerrillas operating in the north. In the aggregate, these losses have been considerable.
At present, most of the civilians are concentrated in areas which formerly housed only a very small fraction of the people. A redistribution of the population will be necessary. At the time of the cessation of hostilities with Japan, virtually every Okinawan had to be rehoused. For a long time, they must live in temporary houses, most of them yet to be built.
The destruction of houses on Okinawa during the war was virtually complete. A few shrines and historic monuments of antiquity survive, most notably the ancient Nakagusuku Castle, dating from the fourteenth century.
Personal properly and household effects.— Here again, the degree of destruction has been overwhelming, but is not total. A great part was burned in houses ignited during operations or subsequently.
When people left their homes and fled to caves in the hills, they took with them what they could carry in the way of food or clothing. As people found themselves confronted with the apparent necessity for living for prolonged periods in the hills they tended to make excursions back to the villages to replenish their supplies or to add to their stores of clothes. Many took lacquerware, china, or other valuables with them into the caves, deeming their treasures safer there. The natives do not appear to have been entirely scrupulous in removing items from villages for use in the hills, and it is evident that there was a considerable amount of looting of houses by natives themselves. It is quite understandable why a man from Naha, cut off from his home by war, or one whose house had been burned, might not be hesitant to enter any deserted house in search of food or clothing for his family in a distant cave.
Of the material taken into the caves, the greater part of it was lost or damaged beyond usefulness. Much of it was abandoned as the people fled from cave to cave or finally came into our lines. As our troops advanced, they overran many hundreds of caves containing a great litter of clothing, bed covers, pots of beans, rice, utensils, household valuables, and the like.
Our troops contributed somewhat to the loss of such items as they passed through villages and caves. Souvenir hunters took some lacquer and chinaware, but comparatively little in the way of usable clothing or gear. However, many hundreds of the straw tatami mats used on the floors were burned or destroyed by troops, who had no appreciation of their value to the natives, and who did not realize that the natives slept on them. This was a serious loss to the people.
Systematic efforts to salvage remaining gear were instituted by Military Government after natives had entered our custody and concentration areas had been organized. Parties of women and older children went out under MP protection and searched deserted and damaged houses, bringing in food, clothing, coverings, and other useful items, without regard to original ownership. Even with complete salvage of all the remaining gear on the island there will be insufficient clothing and covering for the people, and great hardship may ensue if the situation is not improved before winter. Stocks of yard goods were depleted before we landed, and there are few looms or spinning machines left with which to commence making textiles anew. Clothing being worn currently cannot be expected to last very long, and it is evident that the entire surviving population faces the necessity for a complete restocking of clothing, covering, tatami, and other household gear before it can settle down to any semblance of a normal life.
Official records, deeds, etc.—The great raid of October 10, 1944, destroyed the Okinawa Prefectural Office in Naha, as well as the Police Station, City Hall, Tax Office, Post Office, and other important public buildings. It is unlikely that the records in these buildings previously had been removed and in all likelihood they were totally destroyed. Thus the largest repositories of official records on Okinawa are denied us.
Furthermore, there is much evidence that the Japanese attempted to destroy systematically all official records in other towns as we threatened to overrun them. Responsible officers entered Nago, Onna, and certain other towns and villages either before or with the assault troops. They had an opportunity to examine the Town Halls, Post Offices, and other public buildings before they had been in any way disturbed by our forces. The great bulk of records was found to be destroyed or so disrupted as to be nearly valueless.
In Itoman some civil and police records were found in good condition.
In Nago certain newspaper archives and stores of official records were recovered initially in fair condition, but were later broken into by our troops and badly souvenired.
No town or village so far has yielded a completely intact file of official records. It is apparent that the Japanese succeeded largely in denying us access to these papers, though in some small part they may have been aided in this respect by our own troops.
Rather pathetic efforts by small householders to save their own deeds, property certificates, tax receipts, bank books, postal savings accounts, and the like, were evident. Neat bundles or boxes of such documents have been uncovered in corners of caves or domestic air-raid shelters, or in buried jars or other places of fancied safety. Later, more acute emergencies caused these documents to be abandoned entirely in most instances, and in any case the destruction of banks and the impact of our invasion have been such as to render such papers nearly worthless.
Thus we are faced with a virtual complete loss of all documents on which we might base any continuity of administration or economy. No adequate records are available on which we might be able to make an equitable settlement of property disputes after the war. Political records, conscription records, and the like are missing. An entirely fresh start will have to be made.
Land.—Prior to our landings Okinawa had a primarily agrarian economy, but agriculture, even supplemented by fishing, did not provide the food required by the population and much rice, wheat, beans, and other staples were imported.
Fishing came to a standstill because of destruction of boats and prohibitions by military command. Wheat, beans, sweet potatoes and other crops were ripening in the fields when we invaded the island. Civilians within our custody were taken out in parties to harvest these crops for utilization. However, there was little new planting or cultivation of fields except in limited areas near concentrations. Even these crops are unlikely to be harvested completely, and agriculture on Okinawa seems destined to come to a virtual standstill with little prospect of appreciable renaissance for at least a year or more.
When opportunity affords a resumption of agricultural pursuits by the Okinawans, the acreage available for that purpose will be reduced greatly. The voracious demands of airfields, roads, port facilities, and other installations are such as to take up a large fraction of the flat terrain which comprises the main agricultural resources of the island. Many fields have been torn up badly by trucks, tractors, and the like, and a certain amount of soil has been scraped off to provide fill. The elaborate system of drainage and small dams which served formerly to control run-off and erosion has been damaged or destroyed in many localities and neglected in others and many fields not utilized directly in base development will suffer extensive loss of topsoil and erosion.
Much of this damage is likely to be irreparable. Topsoil washed to sea cannot be replaced. Even if some of the airfields or roads be abandoned after they have served their purpose, there will be little prospect of restoring fertility to the hard coral-filled strips for many years. One must face the fact that our operations and base developments have reduced seriously and permanently the future capacity of Okinawa to support human life by agriculture.
Effect on the health of natives.—So far, there is no indication that factors accompanying our invasion have caused any serious deterioration in the health of the natives in our custody except for the actual casualties inflicted in battle. This is remarkable indeed, considering the conditions the natives were living in during such time as they were abiding in caves. It may betoken a high degree of natural resistance to the diseases endemic in the area. However, scabies, various skin infections, lice, fleas, and the like have flourished during cave life and the subsequent overcrowding. Crowded conditions in concentration areas lend themselves to the spread of disease, and one can look for the possibility of an increased incidence of tuberculosis and of certain other maladies in the future.
The psychological effect of invasion and occupation on the Okinawans.—Oriental and occidental visitors to Okinawa in days prior to the Japanese annexation reported uniformly that the people of the island were hospitable and polite. Commodore Perry was received kindly in Okinawa, in contrast to his experiences in Japan proper. There appears to be no tradition of hostility to foreigners such as has characterized long periods of Japanese history.
The Japanese have endeavored to impose their patterns of thought on the Okinawans. It is now evident that in this enterprise they have not had any great degree of success.
In spile of the fact that our invasions and air attacks have wrought such havoc and dislocation on the island, the Okinawans in our custody do not appear to hate us particularly. Indeed if it were not for the presence on the island of scattered Japanese military personnel and certain residual Japanese officials attempting to stir up the Okinawans, it is doubtful if they would cause us any appreciable trouble.
The Okinawans were informed by the Japanese that if Americans landed the people would be slaughtered with great cruelty, one and all. Apparently, the enemy did not anticipate the extent of the physical changes we would wreak on the island or understand what its impact on the civilians would be, or if they did appreciate this factor, little effort was made to exploit it for propaganda purposes. The Okinawans were told of our expected carnal cruelty through newspapers, over the radio, and by word of mouth.
There was nothing in our pre-invasion bombardments to cause the Okinawans to disbelieve the propaganda supplied them, and as our troops landed and advanced the populace fled almost without exception, fearing for their lives even though much of the island was overrun without fighting.
That deep fear of torture or death was uppermost in the minds of most of them was apparent to any who watched civilians enter our custody, particularly in the first few days and weeks. Aged Okinawan obasans (grandmothers) discovered in caves were often hiding in deep recesses covered head and foot with quilts, and when uncovered by marines would kneel and bow their foreheads to the deck time after time with hands prayerfully pressed palms together before them, beseeching their discoverers most piteously to spare their ancient lives. Their relief on being reassured and kindly treated was so marked and apparent as to leave no doubt of the validity of their expressed emotions. In like manner, mothers or old folks entering our lines in desperation because of the intolerable conditions of cave life often displayed on first contacting troops such apprehension and fear as to cause them to tremble; yet after a day or two in the security of the concentration area their attitude would change visibly and they would relax and smile and co-operate happily in the camp routine.
The average American soldier or marine on Okinawa proved to be kindhearted and friendly towards the natives, especially towards the children, and the cheery greetings and largess of GI rations, candy, or even cigarettes poured out on civilian wayfarers along the roadside from jeeps and trucks did much to overcome their initial fear of us, and to convert this fear into reciprocal friendliness.
Thus, on initial contact with our troops, most Okinawans found their fears of bodily harm unfounded, and the resulting relief seemed to mitigate in large measure their dismay at contemplating the loss of their homes.
Once taken into civilian concentration areas Okinawans have found that their principal contacts with Americans have been with Military Government personnel. Many of these Military Government people in daily contact with the natives have worked with great devotion for the welfare of the community in their care. The people have responded to this and have repaid kindness with gratitude. Without doubt, the hospitals and dispensaries set up for the people have been the greatest single factor in getting their good will.
It has struck many observers as remarkable that the Okinawans appear to accept philosophically discomforts, inconveniences, and hardships resulting from administrative foul-up or necessities of war, whereas similar experiences would set an occidental population into seething resentment and unrest. For example, the forced movement of 20,000 civilians from their villages on Motobu Peninsula into areas where not even minimal shelter was available did not provoke any incidents or trouble.
This point might be further amplified by recounting in some detail the experiences of civilians caught in the south behind the Japanese lines. These people suffered more severely than the general run of the population. Perhaps 50,000 or more were thus entrapped, either by choice or by chance. The Japanese military made no efforts to further their welfare, and provided them neither food nor medical attention nor supplies. On the contrary, the Nip soldiers often confiscated food and other necessities from slender civilian stocks, and towards the end were even evicting the bewildered natives from cave shelters coveted by a harassed soldiery. The unfortunate civilians were not only subjected to danger from chance shots, but also at times became targets of artillery, naval gunfire, or aerial attack as a result of being confused with the enemy troops.
Several tens of thousands passed into our lines in late June as organized enemy resistance collapsed in the southern part of the island. Their numbers had been greatly depleted by deaths already, and of those appearing at that time, about one-quarter were in need of medical attention and many were grievously wounded, some with injuries unattended for many days. Medical facilities for civilians were not provided in southern Okinawa, except for those which could be spared from hard-pressed tactical line units. As a result, the majority of the injured received inadequate or no medical attention when first coming into our lines. The people were crowded into trucks, wounded and all, and sent north over rough roads to concentration areas, some of which were 40 miles away. This bouncing ride was particularly hard on unsplinted fracture cases. The routing of truck-loads of civilians seems to have been confused, as truck drivers often found that the camp to which they were ordered to take the loads was unwilling to accept the people, and directions were given to take the natives on to another area, where in many instances the process was repeated. Thus truck drivers were often put into the position of shopping around to deliver their loads. During the ride and incident delays the people were not provided adequate food and water or treatment and many were removed from the trucks at the final destination dead or in a state too far gone to permit recovery. Small wounded children were particularly susceptible to dehydration during the trip.
Medical care, food, and water were available at the end of the journey, and those receiving such assistance were appreciative and grateful. Apparently they saw no reason why we should help them at all, and hence when at the end of the trip they received kind treatment, they regarded it as an unexpected windfall rather than as any right due them under humanity.
Within the concentration areas, civilians proved to be docile and co-operative, and appeared to be reasonably content for the time being to abide by the conditions the war had forced on them. There has been almost no evidence of hostility or acts of violence or treachery on the part of Okinawans directly in our care. Japanese soldiers attempting to mingle with civilians to escape capture were usually turned in to MP’s by the civilians themselves. Headmen came forth without hesitation and usually performed their duties as expected. Difficulties were experienced mainly in enforcing sanitary regulations and the like.
This state of affairs was disturbed slightly at times by guerrilla bands comprised of defeated remnants of enemy troops. They gathered together and organized after having been scattered by our operations and patrols, and have made forays into some of the concentration areas. Such guerrilla bands have killed some of the headmen and intimidated others, carried off food from civilian stocks, and thrown a discordant note into affairs. A number of headmen waxed fearful and resigned and a noticeable stir of mild apprehension became apparent. It is noteworthy that these guerrilla activities did not serve to turn the Okinawans against us, but rather brought resentment down on the Japanese themselves.
At the risk of oversimplification, one might summarize the attitude of the average Okinawan as follows: He appears to be desirous of being left in peace to farm his land, and is not particular as to the auspices under which he would labor. It appears to him that we are in Okinawa to stay, and that we intend to do what we can to see that the Okinawan is fed and cared for and given medical attention. He foresees the possibility of a tolerable life under us, and hence regards further interference from Japanese as undesirable. He hopes for an amelioration of the present crowded and inconvenient features of camp life, and desires normal family routine to be restored. He is grateful for the medical care and food supplied. He is willing to co-operate with the above ends in view, and is relieved to realize all his dire fears are not likely to materialize.
The reaction of certain Okinawans who have had previous contact with westerners differs somewhat. Several natives appeared who had lived for a while as colonists or otherwise in Hawaii, Peru, Brazil, or other localities in the Western Hemisphere. From the start they knew that Japanese tales of anticipated American atrocities were false. They entered our lines early in the campaign and without fear, and were in some instances of considerable assistance in persuading terror-stricken natives that we would protect them and in giving service as headmen.
The reaction of certain educated and intelligent Okinawans and Japanese people of whom one might speak as “intelligentsia” is also worthy of mention. Perhaps the characteristics of the salient features of this reaction were exemplified by Dr. Iyesaka and expressed in a signed statement he prepared and submitted (see appendix). In brief, such educated people had had some contact with Western liberal and scientific ideas and were impressed by them. This early liberal impression appears to have been submerged by repeated propaganda along orthodox Japanese philosophical lines reinforced by continued Japanese success in battle, until many persons seemed almost to believe that Japan was indeed a divine country destined to rule the world, and that the continued victories evidenced this concept. Such semi-convinced individuals conformed with the group about them until confronted by realities of defeat and a shattering of the mystical concepts of Japanese myths, whereupon they embraced anew the very same liberal and objective methods of thought which they had sought to repress for so many years.
It has been remarked often that orientals seem to feel deep psychological necessity to conform in patterns of thought with the predominant group around them. Now that our thoughts are predominent in Okinawa, this factor lends itself to our advantage.
Present tendencies.—By now (July 10) the violent disturbances of war have been accomplished and the people are settling down to a camp economy destined to continue for many months. Administrative organizations, courts, ration system, police systems, and the like arc working in the concentration areas with increasing efficiency. New housing is being erected in amounts sufficient to ameliorate partially the present very grave overcrowding. Native handicrafts are starting up again, and an effort is being made to make the people as self-sustaining as possible within the limitations set by the concentration areas. Perhaps surprisingly, the people seem to be reasonably happy under the circumstances prevailing.
It seems quite apparent that the Okinawans potentially lend themselves favorably to any long-range military utilization of the island of Okinawa. There seems to be no reason why, if handled properly, they cannot be turned into native citizens as loyal as the Guamanians or Filipinos. Every indication is that the Okinawans will respond favorably to an enlightened program incorporating adequate and sympathetic consideration of their health and material and psychological welfare. Such a program, properly integrated with the present and future military use of the island, may repay us many times over in case hostilities develop in the area after this war.
Appendix.—The following statement was prepared spontaneously by Dr. Kosaburo Iyesaka, a Japanese physician who was trained in a Japanese Imperial University medical school and who subsequently went to Okinawa and practiced many years in a village in the northern part of the island. He appeared inside our lines within a few days of the time in which his territory was overrun and went to work immediately assisting in the care of the numerous sick and injured Okinawans in our custody.
The statement was written in mid-April, 1945, entirely on his own initiative, without prompting or request in any form from any outside authority. The original statement is given here exactly as Dr. Iyesaka wrote it, including all the imperfections in English. The original statement was released to the press during the Okinawa campaign and has been printed in whole or in part in various newspapers throughout the country.
DOCTOR IYESAKA'S STATEMENT
Gentlemen:
Honourable Army and Navy Surgeons; High Officials of American campaign here:
Dear Doctors:
I beg your pardon to let me speak a little in this opportunity in meeting with you here in the battlefield. To show how I have felt, nay what the greater part of intelligentsia of Japan are thinking, about the war between Japan and America may be somewhat interesting for you to hear. For 1 am very sorry to see with my naked eye the accurate defeat of the Japanese Army which overshadows preluding the downfall of the great Japanese Empire having the glorious history during 3000 years. Such datum as the downfall of our Fatherland, Nippon, is a most tragical and horrible fact never to be thinked of by us Japanese. For we all Japanese thinks Japan as a Land of Gods (Shinkoku) (Kaminokuni) never to be trampled down by any other nation.
(1) Before six centuries against the great Mongolian Army.
(2) Before 50 years against the great Chinese Army.
(3) Before 40 years against the great Russian Army we get great victory every time at the moment of crisis of downfalling.
(4) Now against the great American Army this time Japan is waging a war which I can see with my naked eye and think over coolminded with the scientific investigation. God save us! The sad and most lamentable conclusions seem to come, quite different with three other eases.
These 3 miraculous victories over the greater nations resulted in aggrandizing and aggravating the value of legend and tradition handed down from the olden times of our forefathers. So we became self-conceited and superstitious dreamers through all classes of Japan, even in the Intelligentsia.
Some professors in the Imperial University who insisted his own free thought from the standpoints of true political science were compelled to be grave criminal. “2x2 = 4 is truth,” as you know. To them dreamers 2x2 = 6 seems like truth. The thought of the land of Gods dominion is against these elementary mathematical axioms. The war against the great American Army is the war of falsehood against truth, the war of tradition against theory, of restriction against freedom.
Now let me glance over the Okinawa people. Their health indeed arc on lamentable and pitiable conditions. The young men in Loochoo districts are sick and wretched from,
(1) Ancylostoma duodenale (ancylostomiasis).
(2) Filaria Bancrofti (filariasis, elephantiasis, bile or milk urine).
(3) Tuberculosis of lung and bone, and others.
(4) Leprosy of every kind, etc., etc.,
Okinawa Island have the highest percentage of leprosy so their efficiency as soldiers and any other workmen is much robbed and enfeebled. The defeat of Japanese Army Corps in Loochoo is a tragical and accurate fact which overshadows the defeat of Japan proper. The people of this small island which could not self-supply his own eating materials are almost starving. But the greater part of them are crimeless and pure at this emergency, unknown what or how they arc fighting. Their sons, houses, living materials, all of them dead or burnt down. Wandering and lodging here and here in the mountain caves and riversides crying and weeping, they are near death, overwhelmed with hideous fatigue. The false propaganda that the American Army should kill not only soldiers but them all, baby, old and weak, and should wipe off the name of Japan from the surface of the eastern globe planted the horrible thought of murderous death upon the brain of all Okinawans.
But the fact was reverse. I could see how the American soldiers are kind and upright to the poor and helpless peaceful man, giving them tobacco and cakes every time they meet. This fact totally different from the propaganda, was a wonder to them. Especially to found the Red Cross Hospital in which many excellent experts and good experienced Army and Navy Surgeons arc busy in helping all sick and wounded of people in general arc surely a mysterious wonder.
But I could not endure to see the miserable and pitiful scene of war on battlefield no more. I am praying for the speedy finish of war in Okinawa, this helping Okinawa from starving. Because if the war continues more, one month later today it is supposed they would really be starved and sickness get bad and dead. God help Okinawa and bless you. Lastly I am deeply indebted to you to give the permission to speak my insufficient English.
/s/ Dr. Kosaburo Iyesaka
戦前の
