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n T he last months of the war ushered in a period of rapid change in the organization of military forces on the Ryukyu Islands. The Joint Chiefs originally assigned both operational control and military government responsibility for the islands to the Navy, but the fact was neither the Army nor the Navy wanted to assume responsibility for the region ' Admiral Nimitz argued that since the Tenth Army had invaded Okinawa to stage the planned invasion of Japan, it should assume these responsibilities. Bowing to the Pacific commander's request, the Joint Chiefs, on 18 July 1945, ordered control of the islands, excluding certain naval facilities, turned over to the Army. This transfer of command, they noted , was to be a temporary expedient; once the invasion of the Japanese home islands was accomplished, command of the Ryukyus was to be returned to the Navy. Effective 31 July, Headquarters, Island Command, Okinawa, was reconstituted as Headquarters, Army Service Command I (ASCOM I), and assigned to Army Forces, Western Pacific." At that time the command's military strength totaled some 259,000 officers and men (see Table I). The Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, General MacArthur, assumed responsibility from his headquarters in Manila for military government in the Ryukyus, although he continued to direct what had been for some time a joint service operation with the preponderance of its manpower in naval uniform. In July civil affairs personnel in the islands included about 2,600 naval officers and men (including Sea bees) and 279 Army officers and men." These a rearrangements lasted only seven more weeks. The abrupt surrender of Japan found the Army ill-prepared to exercise its responsibility for military government on Okinawa. Its few hundred civil affairs officers on the island were desperately needed for occupation duty with the Tenth Army in Korea and with the Eighth Army in Japan. Consequently, the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, advised the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Fleet Admiral Nimitz, that military government would be a permanent Navy responsibility." On 2 1 September 1945 the Navy assumed complete accountability for military government although the Army retained operational control of the islands. Fleet Admiral Nimitz designated the Commanding Officer, Naval Operating Base, Okinawa, Rear Ad m. John D. Price, as Chief Military Government officer while Col. Charles I. Murray, USMC, continued in his capacity as Deputy Commander for Military Government. " The Navy accepted responsibility for military government based on the assumption that Okinawa was desirable as a naval base and that the Navy would soon be given operational control, since the Army's tenure in the Ryukyus was merely temporary. Both assumptions proved false. The surrender of Japan not only curtailed Army Service Command I's base development plans, it also obviated most of the rationale for development of Okinawa's naval facilities. Moreover, by early 1946 the Navy had more closely examined the anchorages in Buckner Bay and found them less desirable than originally thought. " Consequently, the Navy lost interest in the Ryukyus except as a location for minor facilities. In March 1946 the Chief of Naval Operations recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Army not only retain operational control of the Ryukyus, but also assume responsibility for military government. Later the same month the Army's Chief of Staff concurred with that recommendation, asking only that Navy civil affairs officers continue to serve until suffi