Interrogation Report #28 Yahara Hiromichi
HEADQUARTERS TENTH ARMY
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2
APO 357CICA/KCL
6 August 1945
PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION REPORT
Tenth Army Interrogation Report #28.
1. PERSONAL DETAILS
Name: YAHARA, Hiromichi
Rank: Col Senior
Duty: Staff officer, 32d Army
Date of Capture: 15 July 1945
Place of Capture: YABIKU Pref
Age: 42
Residence: TOTTORI Pref
Occupation: Army officer
2. ASSESSMENT
a. Details of Capture:
After attending the dinrier preceding the suicides of Generals USHIJIMA and CHO, Col YAHARA, in civilian clothes, proceeded to carry out orders received from General CHO - '"After participating in the final defense of OKINAWA Island,Staff Officer YAHARA will proceed and take part in the defense ofthe hc•meland'". He made his escape from the MABUNI caves inspectacular fashion, rolling over a cliff when observed by Bluetroops, inadvertently firing his pistol during the descent. Thisperformance was apparently the basis for rumours that YAHARA hadbeen killed at NABUNI. Alive, though bruised by the fall, ColYAHARA joined a group of civilians in a cave intending to remainwith them and to work his way north, hoping eventually to reachJapanese Territory by small boat. When Blue troops approachedthe cave YAHARA led the group out and accompanied them to theYABIKU civilian compound where he successfully assumed the guiseof a school-teacher. Three days on a labor detail depletedYAHARA'S already weakened endurance; he collapsed and spent thenext two weeks resting. The presence of an idle but complainingstranger aroused the suspicion and resentment of an alertOkinawan who took Col YAHARA aside and demanded an explanation.YAHARA revealed his identity but appealed to the man's patriotismand begged his silence. To his chagrin the Okinawan immediatelyreported his presence to local CIC agents who returned and tookYAHARA, bitter but unresisting, into custody.
b. Evaluation:
Quiet and unassuming, yet possessed of a keen mind and afine discernment, Col YAHARA is, from all reports, an eminentlycapable officer, described by some POWs as the '"brains'" of the32d Army.His life falls into the pattern of many career officers ofthe Japanese service.
The son of a small country land-owner,YAHARA won an appointment to the Military Academy, graduating in1923. Although promotions came slowly he won some distinction as a junior officer and attended the War College, graduating, according to his account, fifth in his class (officer POW's attribute this to native modesty, holding that YAHARA led his class). His subsequent assignments included duty in the UnitedStates, in CHINA, and as a plain clothes agent in SIAM, BURMA,and MALAYA. Col YAHARA attributes his frequent change of duty to a propensity to disagree with superior officers which made him an undesirable among certain old-line officers.
Col YAHARA discusses the OKINAWA operation freely though he has indicated that he will not divulge information which he considers vital to the security of the Empire. There is no reason to believe that he has made any attempt at deception. It should be borne in mind that his observation of the campaign was made from the comparative safety of SHURI castle and that in some instances his narrative may differ from that of front-line troops. The present reportmaking no attempt todeals only with the OKINAWA operation, delve into the Col's pre-Okinawanexperiences.
3. INTELLIGENCE
a. Chronology
Grad from Military Academy.
To 54th Inf Regt (OKAYAHA).
To 63d Inf Regt
Entered Army War College
Grad from War College.
Returned to 63d Regt.
To Personnel Dept of War Ministry
To US as exchange officer.
Wilmington, Boston,Washington D.C.
Att 8th Inf Regt for six months at Fort Moultrie
Returned to Personnel Dept, War Ministry
Appointed as instructor (strategy and tactics) at Army War College.
Three months in China as staff officer with 2d Army (In CHINA Exped Force)
Returned to Army War College as instructor.
Sept-As Japanese agent to Siam, Burma, Malaya.
Nov-Dec-To General Staff as expert on SE Asia.
1944-1945 July-To Bangkok as Ass't Military Attache.
15 Nov-Received secret orders to staff of 15th Army SAIGON.
Remained at Bangkok and participated in the negotiations for the peaceful occupation of SIAM.
Then participated in the BURMA operation with the15th army.
April- Became ill and returned to Japan.
Again assignedto War College as instructor.
16 Mar -To OKINAWA as advisor from Imperial Staff, 32dArmy Hq, soon formed and assigned as Senior Staff Officer.
15 Jul - Captured.
b. Pre-L-Day Estimates and Preparations:
The successful US invasion of the MARIANAS convinced staffofficers both in the 32d Army and the General Staff that the USwould attempt a landing either on TIAWAN, the RYUKYU RETTO, orHONGKONG within the year. The 32d Army staff believed that,because of its strategic position, OKINAWA would certainly beinvaded; opinion in TOKYO remained more indefinite, some favoringTAIWAN. The attack was expected either as (a) an immediatelanding based from and using troops available in the MARIANAS or(b) an attack mounted from the SOWESPAC area when the tacticalsituation should permit the withdrawal of troops from that area.The first possibility was regarded as a more dangerous threatsince OKINAWA was totally unprepared to repulse enemy landings atthat time. The landings on the PALAUS and on LEYTE came as arespite, indicating that US plans did not include an immediateattack in this area. The landing was then expected from lateMarch to June 1945, on the assumption that the situation in thePHILIPPINES would have eased sufficiently by that time to permitthe withdrawal of troops and the use of LEYTE as a staging area.The OKINAWA landing was expected to take place before the IWJlanding because IWO was considered of lesser importance. Somefalse confidence was inspired by intelligence reports that notenough troops were available to effect a landing on OKINAWA forsome time to come. However, in late Feb reports of shipping concentrations in the MARIANAS and LEYTE convinced the 32d Army staff that the attack would come in late March or early April. From an early date the principle guiding the Japanese planof defense was that since it was impossible to defeat theinvading enemy, the most successful plan would be that whichdenied him the use of the island for as long a period as possibleand cause him the greatest casualties. The following plans were suggested, the first being that which was adopted.
1. To defend, from extensive underground positions, the SHIMAJURI sector (i.e. that part of OKINAWA S of the NAHA-SHURIYONABARU line) the main line of defenses being N of NAHA, SHURI,and YONABARU. Landings N of this line will not be opposed;landings south of the line will be met on the beaches. Since it,.. .. ". ' ; .. ·'c...will be impossible to defend KADENA A/F, 15 em guns will beemplaced so as to bring fire against the airfield and deny the (invaders its use. ·
2. To defend from prepared positions the central portion ofthe island, including the KADENA and YONTAN A/Fs.
3. To dispose one Div around the KADENA area, one Div inthe southern end of the island, and one Brig between the twoDivs. to meet the enemy wherever he lands and attempt toannihilate him on the beaches.
4. To defend the northern part of the island with Army Hqin NAGO and the main line of defense based on Hill 220 NE ofYONTAN A/F.
The proponents of this course maintained that theterrain in the northern OKINAWA was most favorable for prolongingthe defense although, admittedly, the loss of the more highlydeveloped southern section was undesirable.Although the withdrawal of the 9th Div seriouslyweakened the forces available for the defense of OKINAWA, themove was not opposed by 32d Army since the Div was r~moved withthe intention of using it to reinforce the PHILIPPINES. Pleasfor reinforcements from JAPAN were made in vain to TOKYO. therewas a feint hope of getting reinforcements before L-Day, but, ColYAHARA states, none whatsoever thereafter.The plan which was adopted, i.e. to defend the SHURIline, presupposed Blue occupation of KADENA and YONTAN A/Fs.Although there was some pressure from TOKYO and certainindividuals within 32d Army to include KADENA A/F within the zoneof defense, this was deemed impractical, due to considerations ofterrain. The defense of KADENA would seriously overextend forcesbarely sufficient for the effective defense of the southern partof the island.The building of airfields on IE JIMA was criticized,since it was impossible to defend the island for more than a fewdays. Accordingly, on 10 March demolition of the airfields wasinitiated. Subsequently, 4.15 em guns were emplaced in positionson the MOTOBU peninsula from where they could be brought to bearon IE.The beaches originally considered most probable forBlue landings were (a) the HAGUSHI beaches, (b) the GUSUKWAbeaches (i.e. the beaches W of MACHINATO A/F) (c) the coastbetween NAHA and ITOMAN, (d) the MINATOGAWA beaches and (e) theN. AKAGUSUKU WAN beaches.By the end of March it was expected that the main Bluestrength, probably 6 - 10 Divs would land upon the HAGUSHIbeaches, immediately securing the KADENA and YONTAN A/Fs.It was believed that the invading forces might,following the initial landing, establish beachhead perimeters,each two Divs in strength, 1 1/2 to 3 kilometers in depth, eachDiv holding 2 km of beach. The perimeters would be maintaineduntil enough supplies had been landed to permit a large-scaleattack, using massed tanks and concentrated arty fire. Theinvaders would rely upon material strength to wear down thedefenders rather than making a frontal assault. It was estimatedthat about ten days would be required to get the HAGUSHI forces (in p6sition to attack the main defense line based on SHURI andmove their main force to the SHURI line and that during that timethe US hoped to force the Japanese to move their main force tothe SHURI line and then to effect a not too costly landing,probably by one Div on the coast some where S of SHURI, probablyMINATOGAWA. Additional landings on IE JIMA were expected but thelandings on KERAMA came as a surprise, foiling their plans forconducting suicide boat war-fare.Artillery was ordered not to fire upon Blue shippingand divs were instructed not to oppose Blue reconnaissance orinitial landings in their sectors until sufficient troops hadbeen brought ashore to render it difficult to effect an escape byboat. The purpose was two-fold, (a) to attempt to deceive Blueintelligence as to the disposition of the Japanese forces (b) toensure that any attack on Blue beachhead positions would engageand ··annihilate"" a sizeable force.The weakest point of the final defense plan wasconsidered to be the CHINEN Peninsula. Landing on CHINEN wouldgive the invaders good observation to direct NGF and a positionfrom which to launch an attack upon the heart of the defensiveline.Accordingly, only the 62d Div, considered to be theirbest and most experienced outfit, was moved into the SHURI line,leaving the main force prepared to annihilate any enemy forceunwise enough to attempt a landing to the south. The 5th ArtyCommand was ordered to place all its component elements indefense of the HINATOGAWA sector. The Arty Command OP wasestablished near ITOKAZU (TS 8384 R). The initial US diversionon the east coast increased their hopes that a landing would beattempted and contributed to the great reluctance with whichtroops were drawn from the S to strengthen the SHURI line. Untilthe end of April enough troops were left in the south to deal asevere blow to any landing. Hope of defending the southern coastwas given up following the abortive counter-attack of 4 May. Anew plan was devised by which the event of a landing, 2-3000troops would fight a delaying action while the main force, givingup NAHA and YONABABU, would establish a circular perimeter aroundSHURI, extending as far south as TSUKAZAN.The absence of a landing puzzled the 32d Army Staff,particularly after the beginning of May when it became impossibleto put up more than a token resistance in the south. Prevailingop1n1on was that the Tenth Army wished to obtain as cheap avictory as possible by wearing down the SHURI line rather thancommitting elements to a possible hazardous landing in the Southin the interests of bringing the operation to a speedier end.Plans for fleet support of ground forces in the defenseof OKINAWA were contemplated but never emerged from a rathernebulous stage. Co-ordination of such activities was in the handof the OKINAWA Base Force. 32d Army also maintained directliaison with the Navy General Staff which actually showed moreinterest in the campaign than did the Army General Staff. Nonaval personnel ashore were specifically charged with directionof NGF should fleet units succeed in reaching OKINAWA.The 32d Army profited from the lesson learned on SA!PANwhere Japanese Arty had been ~iped out in the first days of theoperacion. The overall command of artillery on OKINAWA was inthe hands of the 5th Arty Command. (The factors responsible for the failure of Japanesearty in the past were thought to be (1) the lack of cavepositions, preferably such that the piece could be fired frominside the cave, and (2) the premature firing, exposing positionsbefore real damage could be done the enemy.Consequently, under the Arty Ccmmand"s direction,preparations were made for concealing the guns emplaced in theelaborate system of caves encountered later by Blue forces.Extensive surveying was conducted by the Arty Survey Co,supplying all arty units with data expediting the problem oftransfer and massing of fire.The Japanese realized that am.mo was insufficient f.or aprotracted campaign. Impassioned pleas to TOKYO brought only theinformation that the shipping situation was acute. The Japaneseprepared, accordingly, to make the most efficient use ofavailable ammo.The caliber of the Japanese general officers chargedwith the defense of OKINAWA was uniformly high. The followingcomments by Col YAHARA throw some light on the characters of thedefeated commanders.Lt Gen USHIJIMA, Mitsuru, CG, 32d Army: A quiet,reserved but extremely capable officer, held in the highestesteem by all men of his command. He was regarded by some as alatter-day SAIGO Tekemor (a military hero of the time of theMEIJI Restoration). He delegated all authority to hissubordinates, yet took the full responsibility for any decisions (made by them. Although an able tactician he took little part inthe aotual planning; his position was, in fact, little more thanan eminently suitable figurehead.Lt Gen CHO, Isemu, C of S, 32d Army: A fieryindividual possessed of tremendous energy, CHO was the drivingforce behind the 32d Army. Quick to anger and demanding, CHO wasnot universally popular but no one questioned his ability, CHOmade no bones about his epicurean tastes; his cellar was wellstocked with better brands of SAKE and an ample supply of Scotchwhiskey. Col YAHARA believes that USHIJIMA and CHO made aperfect combination, USHIJIMA acting as the balance wheel onCHO's drive.Lt Gen F~JIOKA, Takeo, CG, 62nd Div: Not a war collegegraduate, FUJIOKA came up through field commands. Quiet andconservative, he was considered the embodiment of the SAMURAItype. Like USHIJIMA he relied heavily on his C of S.Lt Gen AMMIYA, Tatsuni, CG, 24th Div: In temperamentAMMIYA resembled FUJIOKA, ·although more inclined to exert hispersonal authority. Hardworking and competent, he was regardedas an excellent leader.Maj Gen SUZUKI, Shigeji, CG, 44th IMB: The leastrespected of the generals, SUZUKI expressed some resentment thatFUJIOKA, who graduated below him at the Military Academy, shouldhold higher rank. He did a competent job though handicapped bylack of experienced staff officers. (~ .... . ·.JC. Enemy OperationsThe tactical direction of the defense resolved itselfinto a struggle between the conservatives, including Col YAHARA,who advocated strictly defensive warfare, and a group of radicalswho proposed that the Japanese take the offensive whenever thereseemed to be the slightest possibility of succeeding.An ill conceived plan for a counter-attack on 8 Aprilwas proposed at a staff meeting on 5 or 6 April. At that timethe 62d Div alone was on the line, eager to take offensiveaction. It was proposed to bring up the 24th Div, 44th IMB, andall major arty units and in one massed blow to drive the invadersto the ISHIKAWA isthmus. The 62d Div was to spearhead theattack, having as its objective Hill 220 NE of YONTAN A/F. The24th Div was to follow, then veer to the east, driving up th~east coast. The 44th IMB was to be held in reserve.The plan met with vigorous opposition of Col YAHARA andother cooler heads among the staff officers who reasoned thateven if the attack should succeed initially the Japanese would beat the mercy of Blue NGF and bombing since no positions had beenprepared in the area. Also, the south would be left defenselessagainst possible landings. The plan was accordingly dropped,reluctantly by a group of fire-eaters, the majority deciding thatonly a madman could envision the success of s~ch a venture.Another factor influencing the decision was a belief that theBlue forces might set up a defensive line S of the AWASEPeninsula, and proceed with the securing of the northern part ofthe Island, putting off the reduction of the south indefinitely.The proponents of aggressive action finally werepermitted to attempt a counter-attack of sorts on the night of 12April. The failure of the venture strengthened YAHARA·s positionas the spokesman of the conservatives.The 62d Div was still holding the line alone with the22d Regt of the 24th Div in reserve in the NISHIBARU area. Onthe night of 9 or 10 April plans were drawn up at a sthff meetingcalling for 3 Bns of the 22 Regt and 3 Bns of the 62d Div toinfiltrate, scattering throughout the area between the lines andthe objective line, 1500 yards north of FUTEMA. The sector linesran through the center of the island, with the 62d Div on thewest and the 22d Regt on the east. Within each sector one Bn wasto occupy the northern one-third, and the last Bn the southernthird. The men were to hide in caves and tombs, awaiting asuitable opportunity to attack on 13 April.The main advantage of the attack was that it wouldprevent the use of Blue NGF or arty since the area would beoccupied simultaneously by Blue and Japanese troops, thusenabling the Japanese to fight upon their own terms, i.e. ·handto-hand combat. On the other hand, the 22d Regt was unfamiliarwith the terrain. As it turned out, this factor accounted forthe complete failure of the attack.Col YAHARA opposed the attack and succeeded in reducingthe forces participation to four Bns.The attack was launched as scheduled. As Col YAHARAhad predicted, the Bns of the 22d Regt were bewildered by theterrain and by dawn had made only 500 yards. They were forced toretire after suffering heavy casualties. The 62d Div Bns faredsomewhat better, one Bn advancing to TA 8378, remaining therethroughout the day of 13 April and returning that night with lowcasualties.On about 20 April, after the loss of TANABARU, theJapanese began to move troops north in anticipation of a Bluelanding in the YONABARU area. The 62d Div, reinforced on theright (east) flank by the 22d Regt was holding a line from OMAGAKOCKI hill 187 to the MACHINATO A/F. Even the blindest staffofficer was growing aware that Blue forces would eventually breakthrough any defenses the Japanese could establish. As yet theJapanese had not suffered crippling casualties and in the opinionof many officers the ti111e was ripe to strike a ""decisive·· blow.Gen CHO, always a proponent of aggressive action, wasinstrumental in the decision to stage the counter-attack. CHOwas vigorously supported by FUJIOKA, CG of the 62d Div, whoexpressed the general desire of his men to fight the decisiveaction in the B2d Div"s zone of defense. Col YAHARA opposed theattack as being premature but was over-ridden.The plan was ambitious. The 23d and 26th ShippingEngineer Regts were to effect counter-landings on the west and eas~ coast respectively during the night of 3-4 May. On 4 Maythe 24th Div (89th Regt on the east, 22d Regt in the center, and32d Regt on the west) were to launoh an attack with FUTEMA as theobjective. The 44th IMB was to follow the 24th Div, bearing wes~to the coast, thus cutting off the 1st Mar Div. The 62d Div didnot participate in the attack.It was Col YAHARA"s opinion, the decisive action of thecampaign. The Japanese were so weakened by its failure that theylost all hope of taking any further offensive action. On 5 MayGen USHIJIMA called Col YAHARA to his office and, with tears inhis eyes, declared that he would, in the future, be guided byYAHARA's decisions.On about 20 May it became apparent to the 32d ArmyStaff that the line north of SHURI would be soon untenable. Thepressure exerted upon the line from both Sugar Loaf and ConicalHill forced a decision as to whether or not to stage the lastditch stand at SHURI. The capture of Sugar Loaf Hill alonecould have been solved by the withdrawal of the left flank topositions S of NAHA and, in Col YAHARA's opinion would not haveseriously endangered the defense of SHURI. However, the loss ofremaining positions on Conical Hill in conjunction with thepressure in the west rendered the defense of SHURI extremelydifficult.On the night of 21 May a conference attended by all Divand Brig CGs was held in the 32d Army Hq caves under SHURICastle. Thre~ possible courses of action were proposed; (1) tomake the final stand at SHURI, (2) to withdraw to the CHINENPeninsula,and (3) to withdraw to the south. The first plan wasfavored by the 62d Div which was reluctant to with-draw from whatthey thought of as their own territory. Other factors favoringthe adoption of this plan were the presence of large quantitiesof stores in SHURI and a general feeling that a withdrawal wouldnot be in the best traditions of the Japanese Army. It was(((recognized that to stay would result in a quicker defeat andconsequently it was discarded in accord with the 32d Army policyof protracting the struggle as long as possible. A retreat toCHINEN was regarded with no great favor by anyone and was deem&dunfeasible due to the difficulties of transportation over roughand mountainous terrain. The discussion resolved in a decisionto conduct an ordered retreat to the south, influenced to a greatextent by the presence of 24th Div positions and stores in thatarea.The transport of supplies and wounded began on thenight of 22 May. The burden of the operation was in the hands ofthe 24th Tpt Regt, an unusually proficient organization commandedby a Col NAKAMUR who later received a commendation for themasterful way in which the operation was carried out. While inCHINA the Regt had been intensively trained in night driving,apparently with some success.The occupation of YONABARU on 22 May carne as a surpriseto the Japanese who did not expect such a move during theinclement weather prevailing at that time, assuming that Blueinfantry would be unwilling to attack without tanks which werethought to be immobilized by the mud. On 23 May elements of the24th Div were despatched to retake the town. The attackcontinued with no success on the 24th and 25th May:At this time the 62 Div sector consisted only of lessthan a 2000 yd front north of SHURI held by one Bn. The mainforce, consisting of about 3000 men was in SHURI, several hundredyards to the rear. Since the pressure directly north of SHURIwas relatively light it was decided to place the Bn on the lineunder the command of the 24th Div and to send the rest of the 62dDiv to assist the 24th Div in the attack on YONABARU. On 25 Maythe 62d Div left SHURI and travelling by a circuitous routeapproached YONABARU from the South, three days being required forthe maneuver. The arrival of the 62d Div failed to relieve thesituation.The mass retreat from SHURI took place during the nightof 29 May. Combat units left one-fifth to one-third of theirtroops behind to hold the line for another day with orders toretreat the night of the 30th. A temporary line from the mouthof the KOKUBA GAWA on the west coast running N of TSUKAZN to TA8069 and then bearing south through KARADERA to hill 157 in TA8367 was occupied on 1-2 June with the 44th IMB manning thesector from the west coast to KOKUBA, the 24th Div from KOKUBA toCHAN, and the 62nd Div from CHAN to the east coast.The 44th IMB retreated through ITOMAN, then bore eastgoing north of MAKABE and through MEDEERA to occupy the westernportion of the line based on YAEJU DAKE, arriving on 3 June. Theremnants of the 62d Div (2500 men) fell back through TAMAGUSUKUMURA and GUSHIGAN MURA occupying the sector south of MAKABE andwest of MABUNI DAKE on 4 June. The 24th Div (7-8000) menwithdrew through the center of the island, taking up the eastflank on 4 June.The message from General Buckner, offering USHIJIMA anopportunity to surrender did not arrive at 32d Army Hq until 17June, a week after it had been dropped behind the Japanese lines.Col YAHARA states that the delay was normal for front-line to Hqcommunications at that stage of the operation. The message wasdelivered to Col YAHARA who bucked it to Gen CHO, after showingit to his staff officers. The staff officers were unimpressedand treated the matter lightly. Gen USHIJIMA's reaction is netrecorded.D. Enemy Intelligence32d Army intelligence was admittedly poor. Although a staffofficer was charged with intelligence he was hampered byassignment to other duties and by the general lack of interest inintelligence among front-line troops. Div staff officers lookedupon intelligence as a minor matter; below division there were nopersonnel concerned with intelligence. Col YAHARA admits that anunfortunate attitude that intelligence work belonged properly onto officers incompetent for operations work prevailed even in thehighest echelon.Col YAHARA states that the greatest single source ofintelligence was US news broadcasts identifying units on theisland and describing the general progress of the operation.Such broadcasts were monitored in TAIWAN and transmitted fro~there to OKINAWA.Practically the only other source of intelligence wasdocuments taken from bodies and wrecked tanks. Although a civilservice official supposedly qualified in the English language wasassigned to Army Hq, he proved himself incompetent and Col YAHARAread captured documents personally. A tank destroyed shortlyafter the 27th [U.S.] Div came into the line yielded an OpPlan ofthat Div. The document was .taken to 32d Army Hq where it wasexamined by Col YAHARA. Most of the document was not ofimmediate interest, however, the "Estimate of Enemy Capabilities"aroused great interest and amusement. On 5 May a Marine enem~situation map, captured during the 4 May counter-attack causedgreat consternation because of its accurate appraisal of Japanesedispositions. Some valuable OB information was taken fromaddresses on personal letters taken from Blue dead. The presenceof the 1st Mar Div on the southern line were discovered in thisfashion.The only US POWs of which Col YAHARA admits knowledge areone navy ensign or Lt (jg) shot down off KERAMA, and 2 or 3unidentified flyers captured in March. The first POW wasinterrogated on OKINAWA and apparently revealed movements of histask force (it is not known how accurately; the Japanese acceptedhis account at face value) but when questioned as to futureoperations [the flyer] advised his interrogators to consultAdmiral Nimitz. This POW was subsequently flown to TOKYO formore intensive interrogation. Col YAHARA can furnish noinformation on the POWs captured in March, beyond the fact thathe thinks they were flown to TOKYO immediately to be worked overby competent interrogators. No POWs were reported to 32d Army Hqduring the operation; if any were taken they were dealt with onthe spot. Orders directing units to attempt to take prisonerswere issued with no results. Several Okinawans suspected ofacting as US agents were turned in, but without exception, they,.. . . ..: ·' .)(((ac~ing as US agents were turned in, but without exception, theywere found to be insane.Occasionally staff officerstransmission but, due to theirinformation of any value.listenedimperfectin .on Blue voiceEnglish, gained noIndicative of the character of Japanese intelligence are tworeports received at Army Hq. The first, received shortly afterthe 1st Mar Div moved into the southern line stated that Chineseand Negro marines had been observed being driven to the front bytanks, presumably to prevent their desertion. A second report,received from an infiltration team, described a gala party,complete with orchestra, chinese lanterns and dancing girls,which had purportedly been seen in progress at FUTEMA.E. Battle LessonsThe 32d Army staff was somewhat puzzled by certain phases ofBlue tactics which were in conflict with accepted Japanesetactical doctrine.The Blue attack against the Japanese line was oftencharacterized by the exertion of uniform pressure against theentire line. When weak points were discovered in the Japaneseline they were generally probed by Blue patrols yet no effortswere made to effect a break-through, if only to gain a temporaryadvantage. This seemed at variance with what the Japaneseconsidered sound tactics, which would advise an attack in forceupon weak points with the objective of causing the enemy heavycasualties, if not of disrupting his defense. The seeminglyover-cautious policy came as a disappointment to many Japanesestaff officers who had hoped to force a decision once the Blueforces had engaged the SHUFI defense line and before the Japanesehad been appreciably reduced in strength.Col YAHAFA and other staff officers became of the opinionthat the lOth Army had been committed to taking the island ascheaply as possible. In retrospect he declares that the policywas probably wise, insofar as it reduced total casualties,although more aggressive action would probably have shortened thecampaign appreciably.Blue methods of tank warfare also came as a surprise to theJapanese. Col YAHARA expressed the belief of the Japanese thatOKINAWA was ideally suited to large-scale tank warfare, at leastin comparison with the home-islands of JAPAN. (In thisconnection, Col YAHARA remarked that the CHIBA Peninsula wasprobably the only area in JAPAN suited by terrain for armoredwarfare. The Japanese themselves find difficulty in conductingmaneuvers on terrain characterized by paddy fields and irrigationsystems.) The Japanese envisioned Blue tank attacks comparablein scale to those of the European war, involving 5 or 6 waves of100 tanks each. Indications that such attacks were notcontemplated came as a great relief to the Japanese. Col YAHARAis, however, of the opinion that Blue superiority in tanks wasthe single factor most important in deciding the battle ofOKINAWA.The Japanese were forced to admit that theirmeasures were ineffective; AT guns were of little usecounterin well-concealed positions and were soon destroyed if moved to positionswith better fiEnds of-Tire-, --·suicide attacks by personnel bearing (.explosive charges were disappointing, while bringing arty fi=eagainst tanks was difficult because of poor communication and theundesirability of firing during the daytime when under airobservation. Some comfort was derived from the observation thattanks would sometimes withdraw in the face of a show of strengthor when accompanying infantry were fired upon.At one point there was a rather wistful discussion of thepossibility of retrieving damaged US tanks and after repairingthem to use in the field. The scheme soon proved to beimpractical. A light AT weapon such as the bazooka is badly neeoed by the Japanese. -The tactical maneuver causing the greatest concern to theJapanese was the so-called "horseback attack" (UMAMORI KOGEKI),i.e. the double envelopment of cave positions. Although theJapanese positions were constructed to as to be mutually selfsupporting, certain unexpected factors entered the picture. Itwas discovered that double-envelopment tactics had beensuccessful not so much because of inherent defects in theconstruction of the positions but simply because troops in nearbypositions were reluctant to endanger their own safety by openingfire on positions which had been enveloped. Orders were issuedthat an officer or NCO would remain on watch at all times in eachposition and that there would be no delay in opening fire uponBlue troops attacking other positions.Flame-throwers were countered by constructing caves with themain passages at right angles to the entrance. To further (minimize the effect of flame-throwers, entrances were coveredwith blankets, shelter-halves, or other heavy materialsthoroughly wetted. Col YAHARA believes that those measures werefairly successful against brief attacks, although admittedlyunable to withstand prolonged attack.Blue night attacks were particularly effective, taking theJapanese completely by surprise. The Japanese had so accustomedthemselves to ceasing organized hostilities at nightfall, and,except for the ubiquitous KIRIKOMITAI, reorganizing and relaxingduring the night that attacks in those hours caught them bothphysically and psychologically off-guard. Col YAHARA believesthat such attacks could have been successfully exploited to amuch greater extent than they were.The 32d Army had experienced considerable bombing and werereasonably certain that their cave positions gave adequateprotection. There was, however, general consternation at theprospect of being under NGF. Col YAHARA was informed by an artyofficer that on BB had firepower equivalent to the arty of 7 InfDivs; this naturally caused him some anxiety which was relievedonly when, after the first naval bombardment of the island, heinspected the results and found that well constructed cavepositions were vulnerable only to direct hits. The followingconclusions were drawn as to the effectiveness against NGF,bombing and arty fire.1. NFG, bombing, and arty directed against an area the size (of OKINAWA will not have much effect against disciplined troopsr,,in well-constructed cave positions. Important positions must besuch that no amount of bombing or shelling will destroy them.2. After positions have been overrun or destroyed by theenemy, dispersion is vital. All movements must be at night.3. The final result will be by hand-to-hand combat.The enemy's first taste of Blue arty was the bombardment bypieces emplaced on KEISE SHIMA, which caused the enemy no littleannoyance, particularly since they had not anticipated any suchmove. Ccu~~ r-battery brought against those batteries wasbelieved tot partially successful.The effe iveness of Blue arty was countered, successfullyto a great E. tent, by the elaborate system of under-groundfortifications. Heavy bombardments, such as came before attackscaused relatively low casualties.Blue observation planes were a constant threat to theJapanese. They learned quickly that the presence of anobservation plane overhead usually presaged enemy fire. And,although they appeared to present fine targets, observationplanes were tantalizingly hard to hit with small arms.Observation planes were, therefore, treated with great respect,all movement being kept to an absolute minimum while these planes were overhead.
